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TESTING AND TAMING OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
BY DAVID R. lNGLIS 
The author of thk timsly pamphbt is Senior 
Physicist of t h  Afgontw N u t h a 2  Lobomtoy, 
c h a i m  of the F d e W i m  of A m d a n  S c h -  
W, and a fowmw Q&OT of the B d W n  of 
Atomic S c i m t W .  . . . I U W m t i u w  are by Bill 
Doue of V W  Semfm, In&. 
Everyme bows that nuclear energy has brought a revolution 
in the life of man. It is a dual cldlmge, a threat and a promise. 
The threat is of utter destrucbIm by the nuclear weapons of 
war. The promise is of an abundant life for all of manldnd based 
on nuclear p e r  and nuclear aids to medicine and 0th 
sciences. The promise will b fulfilled only If we live long 
emu@, somebow evading the k t  of destruction. 
It would be more pIaasant to dwell on the promising side, 
to hope &at by emphasis m %tams for p e ~ ~ 8 ~  we a d d  some 
how push the h t  into the background. That approach is a 
little like. sweeping the dirt: under the rug. It is the purpose of 
this pamphlet to look insteadat the moreserious aspect of the 
atomic age, at the tbxeat and to see whether them is something 
we can do to a m e h t e  it. 
threat of nucicor weapons 
The big bombs of past wars destroyed mainly by blast, the a d -  
den pressure wave In the air capable of pushing over brick walls 
and twisting the landscape. There were special bombs for sbrap 
nel, and special fairly small *incendiary bombs" used in great 
numbers for starting fires, but most of the big-bomb damage 
was done by blast 
A nuclear weapon, tm, inflicts mu& of iEs damage by blast, 
but the same weapon also jn%icts peat damage in its vicinity 
by an immediate flash of intease radiation. In addition to this it 
sends up a great cloud of radioactive material which trickles 
down to earth many miles away and contaminates areag 
with delayed and biologically harmful radiation, or fallout 
what war means 
Blast and the immediate radiation from the bomb are its punch 
as a weapon of war, by which it can destroy whole cities or 
knock out even hardened missile bases if it hits close enough 
These efEects can be isolated in pea-time testing of nuclear 
weapons to sea or desert where they will do no serious ham. 
But only the nearby and most intense part of the fdout can 
be isolated in this way. Some of the fallout comes d m  thou- 
sands of mil= from the site of the test, some of it years later, 
arid small amounts of it enter into our fwd and affect us all. 
Fortunately. i t  is only a my sman part of the total fury of a 
bomb that affecEs us as a result of tests, but the number of 
bombs tested is very small compared to the number that would 
be used in a nuclear war.  he &al of alrnost e hundred mega- 
tons of fission yield of all bombs which have hem tested by all 
four nuclear nations probably amounts to less than 1 per cent of 
wr stdpile. Thus, while we study the effects of -time 
fdout, we must bear in mind that whatever harm might be 
done by fallout is extremely small indeed compared to the havoc 
of the nuclear war we must prwent 
TESTING AND FALLOUT 
Nuclear weapons cannot be dweloped to any great extent with- 
wt testing Small improvements can presumably be made by the 
present nuclear powers on dle basis of themetical calculations 
alone, building on the experience of past tests. But making 
big advances and establishing coddence in newly designed 
weapons requires tests. Such advan- in the past have required 
not single tests but whole series of tests. A non-nuclear nation 
will require quite a series of tests to gain experience and become 
a nuclear power, unless it is supplied w i d  very detailed weapons 
information or with the weapons themselves by one of the pres- 
ent nuclear powers. 
Almost all nuclear test. have been carried out in the atmo. 
spere. Six were carried out underground in Nevada in 1!3!3758. 
These were quite small tests. Two have been carried out above 
the atmosphere about three hundred mile above the South 
Atlantic in 1958. 
Tests in the atmosphere (and those immediately abwe the 
trtmosphere) deposit great quantities of radioactive materials in 
the air, in the form of fine dust. Eventually this falls to the 
ground, mainly brought down by rain or snow. But it may reside 
in the atmosphere a long time before it reaches the ground. This 
is fortunate, because many of the radioactive materials are so 
short-lived that they have lost most of their radioactivity before 
they fall. 
A one-megaton bomb produces as much energy as the explo- 
sion of a million tons of TNT, That's a lot of TNT. It would fill 
a trench six feet wide and six feet deep ten miIes long. Now 
think of a third as much radium, a third of a million tons of it. 
Radium is a very radioactive substance. The radiation (counting 
gamma rays only) from the products of a one-megaton bomb 
one hour after it explodes is equivalent to that of all that radium 
If the material from the bomb could be kept in one place, its 
radioactivity would rapidly become weaker: after a day, it 
would be d y  one-meth as strong, b a WE&, we 0v&hm 
dredth. A yew afrer the exphion, the radioactivity would be 
equivalent to about six tons of radium, which is still a lot - far 
more than the world's supply of radium. 
local fallout I I 
But while its radioactivity is decaying, it is also being diluted 
by spreading out into the atmosphere in various ways. It spreads 
in merent ways for bombs of Werent sizes. Most A-Bomb 
have enough power to push their mushroom clouds of hot radio- 
I 
active gaws seven to ten miles high The part of the cloud that 
gets up there may stay there for sorrnething Wre a month or mom. 
That is time enough for it to be b h  around the wmId in an 
--west h d  - it doesn't spread far north or south. Some 
whme h this band w i t h  a couple af months most of it own- 
down in rain. But part of the radioactive material is too coarse 
to get well mixed with the lofty winds and comes down much 
sooner as "1d fabut". This is particularly stccmg if the bomb I is exploded near enough to the pund to suck up a lot of 
aeutrw-irradiated eartb. 
Local fallout spreads on the grwnd in what may be lethal: 
intensities for maay miles downwind perhap hundreds of milw 
if it i s  a big bomb. In war, this wwld mean that many millions 
of people not within the range of the blast and immediate radia- 
tion uf any of the bombs would neverthdm be Idled ar very 
seriously injured. h most d the area the injury to a person 
would come from several hours of exposure to the radiation com- 
ing from the s h c e  of the ground about him. 
Shielding by several feet of earth or ammete wodd provide 
pmt&ion sgahst this, but being in an ordinary house above the 
level of the gmmd wouldn't help. Being in the basement below 
ground level d d  provide prokction if one could stay there 
'I 
for several weeks while the intensity of the radiation decays. 
After that, if (aptimfstici) the war should stop with one at- 
tack, one of the most urgent problems would & how to provide 
4 
food from the oontarninatd soil. The fallout in war, in addition 
to all the other damage, would be so enormously much worse 
than fallwt from testing that our primary concern, as we discuss 
the testing of nuclear weapons, must be to avoid war. 
The local fallout from testing is deliberately c&ed to rela- 
tively uninhabited areas. Even so, it has mused tmuble. The 
unlucky crew of the Japanese fishing vessel *Lucky Dragon" 
received a d o u s  dose of radiation, fatal to one of them, about 
one hundred miles away from a Bikini H-bomb test in 1954. A 
group of Marshall Island natives, even thwgh evacuated 
quickly, were sadly injured. At wr continental proving grounds 
in a Nevada desert, wmpatativeIy smaU bombs have been 
tested, a fraction of one per cent of tbe big H-bomb in power. 
Serious trouble with Iocal fdmt has thus been avoided. But the 
radiation levels for a few arid towns have been high enough to 
cause some concern. 
worldwide fallout 
A big H-bomb produces such an immense body of hot air that 
its mushroom cloud rises quickly up into the stratosphere, per- 
haps 25 miles above the earth. If the bomb is burst several miles 
abave the earth, almost all of its radioactivity is carried up into 
the stratosphere, where it mixa with worldwide air currents a d  
stays for m y  months. If the bomb bursts less than two or three 
mi le  above the earth, as would be more usual in d a r e ,  the 
intensely bright and radioactive %all of firem which farms at the 
time of the burst would be large enough to reach the ground. 
Earth would be vaporized and local fallout wwld be intense. 
But in either case, much of the radioactivity is carried daft 
for worldwide distribution. Up there, high above the weather, 
the air cirdation is more regularly east-and-west than it is with 
the prevailing winds near the ground. How- it also seems to 
spiral gradually from near the quator towards the pies. The 
gradual mixing of the air fswn the stratosphere into the lower 
regions seems to take placer mostIy near the poles, where add 
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air descends. The d h c t i v e  material may spend a month or 
mure in the tmpwphere getting mixed up with the weather be- 
fore it starts to came down in rain Most of it falls in the n d -  
temperate zone, induding the laorthern half of the United States. 
The nice tbing abwt this arrangement is that practically n w e  
of this worldwide fallout m e s  down very soon, and there is 
time for the very m b e  and shorl-lived part of the radioactivity 
to die. The long-lived radioactive elemrents of the bomb debris 
are the ones which cause concern. The most important of thae 
are known as Strontium 90, and Cesium 137. It takes about 
thirty years for these materials to lase half of their radioactivity. 
present mnd fwure fallout 
The increase of radioactivity fnmr fallout in the past few yaars 
is shown by measurements d the Strmtium 90 in the soil near 
New York City. The measurements are in a unit d e d  miUi- 
curies per square mile, and the increase is interesting. At  the end 
I of 1954, the level of radbctivity was 7 units, at the ead of 1958, it was 25 units, and at the end af 1958, whm testing had just stoppi by mutual consent of the US and the USSR, it was SO mi@. But the intensity of Strontium 90 radiation has kept right on going up, because this material is st& for years in the upper atmosphere and fails out slowly. how fallout injurer people TheTe is a great d d  of coafusion in pmple's minds about how much harm may be h e  by fallout from testing. The confusion arises because the technical facts are meager and they are inter- preted by people who take different attitudes towards u n d -  tics. Thase attitude vary all the way from -what WB don't lmow won't hurt us" to safe than sorry." Unfmbmably, &there's a lot we don't know for sure. The best dentists can do in this 
new and insdliciently explored Geld is t~ give probable d t s  
and limits of uncerhinty. 
More M c a l l y ,  n u b  testing affects future human life in 
two important ways. It has bearing on the likelihood of war, 
and it produces fallout which is harmful to an uncertain degree. 
If one judges that testing makes war less likely, he must amsida 
whether a possible saving of life in this way mun&balances an 
inevitable but laser harm to life though fallout. Some who hold 
this view tend to minimize fallout damage and emphasize the 
small end of the range of uncertainty. An opposing point of view 
is that each big bomb tested ia the atmusphere condernns a num- 
ber of people around the world to death - we M t  lmow whom 
nor how many - and holds that no nation has the right: to do tbis 
to other people. 
There are others who are convinced that continued testing 
would make war more likely. For t h e  is no m&ct b 
tween the two considmatiom. Both lead to the conclusion that 
worldwide abstinence from testing is desirable if attainable. 
With this perspective, let us examhe the nature of the harm 
dane by fallout from b t s .  
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injury C O U ~  by fallout 
Radiation from fdout hurts p q l e  in two ways. It causes 
diseases in people now living and shortens their life span. By 
causing changas in the reproductive cells of people now living 
it causes genetic damage to people of future genmah. By 
way of sIight -ce, it may at least be said that the total 
amount of hth  kinds of bouble expectd as a r d  of past 
bomb tests is very mall cornpad to the total amount of sucb 
trouble in the world. There are many thousands of cases of radia- 
tion-indud dismse in the world every year and the am& of 
misery involved is tremendous. Yet the population of the -Id 
is so large that the number seems small on a percentage basis. 
These Efects Of RmWion and F&t have been discussed 
in a pamphlet of that title by James F, Crow in somewhat mare 
detail than is possible here.' There has been no change in funda- 
mental knowledge since the publication of this pamphlet, only 
in some detailed estimates which remain uncertain. 
THE HORROR OF NUCLEAR WAR 
It is very difEcult to gasp the horrible destruction would 
come with nuclear war. W e  seem to have a mental bmir that 
protects us from the unpleasantness of mntemp1ating human 
grief on so vast a scale. W e  should at I& be aware that the 
s d e  of pain and dmth and desolation would be vast indeed, 
and that it mn happen here. It would not be Wre the bombing 
of England or Germany in the last war, when in two or three 
years as much explosive energy was delivered as would be car- 
tied today in a single medium-sized H-bomb. Those raids were 
terrible enough, but they were small and innauxous compared 
to what would happen taday. The d=truction was spotty and 
there was time for succor and reorganization between raids. 
Today whole cities would go out in a flash, the entire organi- 
zation of our society would disappear over night. The instantly 
----- 
'Effects nf Rdbtfm and F a h u t .  Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 256, 25#. 
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dead within two miles of a bomb would be lucky compared 
with those farther away whose skin might peel & from flesh 
burns, or who might be incinerated in the fkshmn. Thm 
would be little or no chance for care of the wounded, for they 
would be legion and in mwt p h  the hdthy people whb 
were further from tfie bombs would have to hide in holes and 
cellars to avoid the radiatim from "l.dg fallout, extending in 
a wide swath hundreds of miles downwind horn each big bomb 
bunt. When they would emerge weeks later, they wwld face 
the pblezn of controlling the panic of desperate mobs fighting 
for the ranaining f d  supplies, and of raising food fit to eat 
from contaminated soil. 
That it wwld be terrible beyond imagination there is no 
doubt, but it is impossible to say just how bad it wwld b, how 
many would survive the direct effects of the initial attack, how 
mar& would d v e  the ensuing panic and turmoil and disease, 
how many might m e  an orderly and productive existence, 
and to what extent some remnants of civilization might survive. 
We haw no experience with human bebavim under such ex- 
treme cir- of terror and universal bema-t. 
Studies have been made of what might happen if we usmnw 
an attack of a certain intensity, but it wodd be a mistake to can- 
sidm the result a prediction of what wllI happen. There was in 
1958 a hearing of a congressional committee investigating the 
results of a single attack with a total of 1,469 megatons dhib 
uted in a particular way ovm the United States. The results were 
discussed as though &is is what we could expect: £ram a nuclear 
war: thirty million people killed outright and many more seri- 
wsly injured. The catch is that this is probably a small fraction 
of the preseht Swiet stockpile, and an attack either now or 
within a very few years a d d  be many times that intense. 
need far a ehonged attitude 
TXS is not ody what could h a p p  here In our belwed country, 
to end all that we know and cherish. If we look at the repeated 
wars of history, if we examine how little we have done to change 
the competitive ways of nations, we may reasonably judge that 
this is what probably will happen here. Yet it's unthinkable that 
it should. Throughout history there always have been wars. 
Suddenly, in the middle of the twentieth century, the very mean- 
ing of the word "war* has completely changed. There must be 
no more war, not even one. If this is to be so, we must examine 
how the ways of mankind can be changed to accompfish it. 
Though eveything is in a state of 0ux, the change ia our pollti- 
cal thinking tends to be gradual, It seems doubthl whether the 
ways of mankind can be changed quickly enough to keep pace 
with the rapidity of technological change, An idea for a small 
change capable of reducing the likelihood of war may be more 
valuable now than an idea for a big change which would even- 
tually make war impossible but leave a serious risk of war in 
the immediate future. 
reducing the liirslihood of war 
Compared with h e r  sorb d disarmament or arms control, a 
worldwide cessation of ksts an the basis of a reasonable control 
agreement is a step which q u i r e  only a small change in inter- 
national political thinking. It would not make war impossible. 
It would not make it appreciably less homiIe if it shouId occur. 
ut it should considerably reduce the danger that war d break 
,,out by accident or design. This is the p t  benefit which would 
"b expected to follow from a good test ban agreement no matter 
whether or not furthm steps of arms control would follow. An 
added benefit is that such an agreement wwld set the stage for 
hther  agreement, not only by giving the world expaience with 
enforcing an agreement, but also by keeping the techniques of 
nuclear warfare from developing to such a &ed stage that it 
might become impossible to bring them under effective control. 
TESTING AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT 
To attain its present advanced state of nuclear technology the 
United States has carried out about a hundred and thirty nuclear 
tests, and the Soviet Union has d e d  out about sixty. Y w  may I ask why these nations would want to carry out more tests when 
they have mdde so many? One answer is that it is the na- 
ture of military competition always to require more and better 
weapons. W e  have now wrne to the point where one bomber 
ca+ing one single bomb (a  twenty megaton H-bomb) can de 
liver more explosive power than was used by all nations through- 
out all of World War II. The present rniIitary desire is not for a 
stilI bigger explosive but for ability to deliver it with a more 
convenient vehicle than a big bomber. There is a similar daire 
far more compactnes and greater ease of delivery on down the 
line of less powerful weapons. 
The nuclear arms race has three separate phases: (1) The 
nuclear natiohs are developing their arms to attain a greater de- 
gree of refinement, This tends to make a surprise attack more 
devastating and swift. (2)  The non-nuclear nations are working 
toward the development of their own nuclear arms. (3) The 
nuclear nations are increasing the stockpiles of the weapons they 
already know how to make. 
A good test ban agreement would put a lid on the first two 
darts,. but not on the third. In this sense, a controlled test ban 
would begm to "taper off the arms race, but would not and it. 
It wwfd pmvent its spreading and growing with ever p t e r  
Anemeat. It: would at least raise prospect of something better 
than the infinite upward spiral until the ultimate explosion. 
There hue a number of causes of international tensions. But 
anxiety wer the future of the arms race is perhaps the most 
dangerous. No one hows when some national leader, stirred 
up over some real or fancied issue and unable to foxesee any- 
thing but ultimate disaster. may in desperation decide to pro- 
voke a showdown when he can have the advantage of surprise 
attack. If, In the -saw of competing developments, he should 
fee1 he had a temporary advantage in weapons' techniques, he 
might feel partioularly tempted to strike, It is in this sense that 
a successful test ban could bring a valuable reduction of ten- 
sions. It would p t l y  slow down the development of evm mom 
insidious weapons. It would level off the upwwd wal od the 
m s  development race. And it d d  move the basis for t h ~  
w e r a t e  decision that one might as well get the war ovm with, 
came what may. 
A mt ban agreement need not Id to any relaxation of na- 
tional to maintain a s u c ~ ~ ~ f u l  dehmnt, and there is no 
logical reasan why it shwld. For that reason it does not require 
any great change ia our political thinking. There is nothing uni- 
lateral about it (aside from the possibility of one side cheating 
in the realm of very small tests). It hampers new d i h y  dwel- 
opments of both sides alike. It Ieaves each side free and, within 
the -tar of mutual detemnts, obligated to maintain a military 
force adequate to make it m e t a b l e  for the other to attadr. 
Two points must thm be quite dear. First, an agreement to 
Ism tests d m  notrneazlgn end to the a r m  race. whatwarneed 
there may be for building more weapons or perfecting the non- 
nuclear components of weapons is not altered. $emnd, we can- 
not expect great economies from a test ban apmmnt done. 
Any saving there might be in not carrying out some aqwcb of 
testing and associated dmfupmeat may be mare than &et by 
Smlutlon - Solution- 
A g#rd test A good te* 
ban agreemenf backed ban agreement backed 
by inspeeion. by inspectian. 
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expdihwes  on tbe test-ban conid sy-. The purpose of a 
teit ban is economy of risk, not economy of d o h .  Suhbmtid 
reduction of militay budgets would 'be expected only aftafter 
further st- of arms oonhl. 
the mony-nuclear-nation problem 
As long as tbe ccanpetidon remains between the tight Angle 
American partnership on the one side and the Soviet Union on 
the other, many people have come to believe that there is a g w d  
chance for mutual d-ts to keep the peace between them for 
quite a few years, perhaps several dead=. It is reasonable to 
hope that each side will act rationally and that neither can ra- 
tionally decide to attack the other. If there were half a dozen 
or a dmen independent centers where the decision could be 
made to launch a surprise nuclear attack, sncb ;a hope would not 
be reasonabIe. Yet the capability to make nudear weapons will 
inevitably spread to many countries if nothing is done to prevent 
it. We axe marching almost inexorably into a world in which the 
danger of an accidental out- of war wilI be even huch 
greater than it is today. wth the spread of nudear weapons 
capabilities, we cannot expect a war to remain confined between 
two blligerents, A war triggered by small nuclear nations is apt 
to engulf large ones. An attacked oountry may even have to 
guess by whom it was attacked. 
The negotiations between tbe three nuclear powers which 
have been progressing at Geneva since 1958 have been working 
toward an initial agreement between thae three powers. They 
have discussed a network of 170 control stations throughout the 
world, of which 21 would be in the U.S.S.R., I9 in the U.S., and 
4 in Great Britain. The immediate difEculty has been one of 
working out a satisfactory compromise between the wetern de- 
sire to have adequate control and the Soviet reluctanc~ to admit 
inspmtors. Once this dif6culty is overcome and an agreement 
can be signed between these three powers, woxk at installing 
the inspection stations in their temitori~ can commence. It will 
I then be necessary to extend the agreement to inelude the & important countries of the worId. Many of them will be easy to persuade, particularly those which have not yet made substantial investments in a nuclear arms program, if we may judge by the attitudes shown in United 
Nations debateg of nuclear testing. The attitude of France shows 
&at persuasion may be Wcult after a nation is thoroughly com- 
mitted to a development program. She has used her p t i g e  as 
a nascent nuclear nation to try to persuade the great nuclear 
powers to go further with disarmament rather then simply 
banning tests, but resisted a b t  ban. 
A non-nuclear nation might feel it unfair that it is askd to 
renounce something that 0th- have and intend to retain. Here, 
one must be a realist and recog&e the unpleasant nuclear facts 
of life. In a sense the p t  nuclear powers are stuck with what 
they have, and dare not let go. Each r&es that its nuclear 
might is a mixed blessing, that it gives it unprecedented power, 
but no real security. It is a deterrent against attack and an in- 
vitation to attack, but h e  invitation might be greater if it would 
let down its guard. The non-nuck powers should rejoice if the 
great nuclear powers can go so far as to agree on an &ective 
k t  ban. Since such an agreement could not be effective for long 
without the adherence of the non-nucIear powers, each of them 
should be willing to adhere to the agreement. 
with hoiding nuclaor weapons information 
In building up alliances to boIster the positions of the two great 
power centers, the great nuclear powexs axe tempted to 
stragthen the ground armies of their m-nuclear allies by 
giving them nuclear weapons. Xf m e  side does tbis, the ottrer 
feels forced to, and thae is no great net gain on either side. Yet, 
there can be a serious net l a s  kmme of the difhuion of nu& 
weapons information to other countries. 
United States policy, as established in 19!jB, is to provide the 
armies of our NATO dim with nuclear weapons, but with a 
string attached. The nuclear warheads themselves remain in U.S. 
possession, under the control of an American &cer on the spot, 
until the emergency arises in which they are to be used. Althaugh 
it is hard to know wbeiher security arrangements are effective, 
this has the purpose of preventing the transfer d d d e d  
weapons information ta the other counhy. Such information 
would make it sigdcantly easier for that country to design 
nuc1mr weapons of its own, and might even make it possible for 
it to become a nudear nation on xt modest scale without carrying 
out any m. It is evident, then, that our present poKq should 
be administered with the utmost caution, and should be re- 
tracted rather &an extended in scope, if we are to retain free  
dom of action in seeking worldwide arms development control. 
Another aspect of the problem is the need to avoid the pas- 
session d dangeaous fissionable materials by dm non-nuclear 
nations. Such materials are made in bulk but are not refined to 
the required quality in the nuclear reactors being instalfed ta 
produce industria1 power in various cowbries. Such reactors are 
built md operated on the basis of bilateral agreements h e e n  
a nuclear and a non-nucIear country. The fuel is ultimately n 
turned to the nuclear country for r e g ,  and this provides a 
controt on the availability of such material for nuclear weapons. 
This function might well be carried out by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency under the auspices of the U.N. 
stopping tests to ovoid fallout 
As we have seen, another incentive for stopping ksb, but a less 
urgent me, is the desire to avoid the radioactive contamhation 
of the atmosphere. WhiIe almost all tests in the past have been 
d e d  out above ground, it seems likely that in the future many 
of them will be d e d  out underground if thwe should be no 
test-ban ageemeat The f a h t  incentive applies only to the 
atmospheric ~ t s .  But the desixe to control arms development 
in order to make war less likely provides a strong incentive for 
u test-ban agreement applying to all kinds of tests. 
C TECHNlQUES OF TEST CONTROL 
The Crst Soviet atomic b m b  ttxt somewhere in Siberia in 1949 
was detected by means of airplanes flying over northwatcm 
United States. Filters itre used to collect radioactive s a m p l ~  
from the air for laboratmy analysis. By this methad it is even 
possible to tell what the h b  was made of and a good dm1 
I about its effectiveness. Thus it would not be hard to set up an 
effective control systm to monitor a worldwide ban on tests in 
the atmosphere. Part of it is operating under national auspices 
h d  y. 
underground tests 
It was discovered by means of a test in Nevada in 1957 that the 
energy and the radioactivity of an atomic bomb can be con- 
tained by the weight of the earth if it is detonated deep under- 
ground, In this test, the bomb was placed at the end of a tunnel 
far into the side of a mesa, placing it under about 800 feet of 
rock. The tunnel was curved near the bomb, in such a way that 
the shock wave from the explosion collapsed and sealed o£F the 
tumeI before any gasses mid escape. Rock was suddenly 
vaporized and the surrounding rock compressed to form a 
spherical cavity. Most of the radioactivity was sealed in a glassy 
inner lining formed from melted rock. The roof of the cavity 
soon caved in and the radioactive glass was concentrated in a 
heap at the bottom, covered by a pile of loose rock. The cave-in 
left a partidy empty space far above the original sphere, but 
not extending to the surface. Although the largest bomb tested 
underground was a 18-kilotons, about the size of the Hiroshima 
bomb, larger explosions might be contained at greater depths. 
In establishing a conbol system to monitor a nuclear test ban, 
the main probIem is to provide assurance that no underground 
tests axe being carried out in secret. They can be detected by 
observing vibrations, known as seismic waves, which they send 
out through the earth. The trouble is that earthquakes send out 
rather sirnilax sign&. These have bsea observed on recordiag 
seismographs for a long time, but seismologists have not had 
t. 
mu& experience in trying to distinguish between earthquakes 
and underground blasts. One method we already h o w  about is 
based on the fact that the blast m h  sudden outward pressure 
in dl dirpections, whereas an earthquake d m  n d  Thus seismo- 
graphs in four directions £mm a blast under appropriate condi- 
t ions would each give a signaI with an upward first motion, as 
compared to two upward and two downward around a normal 
earthquake. A few earthquakes are abnormal in this respect and 
might be suspected of being blasts. For this reason an ideal con- 
trol system based on present technorogY would indude both a 
network of seismographic detection stations and an arrangement 
whereby suspicious signals w d d  be followed up by a careful 
inspection of ail clues on the spot where the signals originated. 
Between the summer of 1858 and tbe summer of 1980 there 
have been a long series of meetings at Geneva to discuss the de- 
tails of an a w m e n t  to set up such a control system. Important 
progress has been made in remnciling differences b e e n  the 
Soviets and ourselves, but substantial aerences remain. It ap- 
pears as though a new awareness of the importance of agreement 
will have to be born on both sides before the find points can be 
settled. The most important question still to be worked out is the 
number of on-site inspections to be authorized. The Swiet Union 
would like to limit the number of its territory to thrm a year. 
The United States is ins-g on more. 
The necessity of having a control system capable of detecting a 
serious violations of a nuclear test ban arise h the distrust 
of one nation by another when they are in the throes of a highly 
competitive a r m s  race. Each wants assurance that the other is 
not obtaining same crucial militay advantage by carrying out 
weapons development involving seaet tests. A control system 
is to be judged, therefore, not only by its ability to detect tests 
that we know how to make, but also to direct them if specid 
ways are devised to hide them. But even if we are suspicious to 
the extent of believing that another nation might go to some 
trouble to hide tests, we must be reasonable in judging how 
much & they might decide to expend. 
muffling tests in big holes 
The method of hiding ~ t s  so far discussed which ixmns the 
least imphusibb involves preparing a wry large round mvity 
deep underground and detonating the bomb at its cater. The 
air space around the bomb muffla the shock transmitted to the 
surrounding rock. Two very difEerent kinds of vibrations go out 
into the r&, along with various intermediate varieties. The 
first is a sharp "ping made when the shock wave in the air 
meets the rock It remains quite strong for two or three hundred 
miles, but becomes rapidly weaker at p t e r  distance?. The 
second is a dull -thudn, a slow outward &ft of the rock to make 
room for the expansion of the cavity when the air in it is made 
extremely hot by the energy of the bomb. This dull signal dies 
When we make a groph to show how the 
pressure in the rack (near the big hole) 
changes very quickly wrth time, the initial 
"p~nq" looks like a high spike, twenty times 
as high as the longer-lasting rise of pressure 
It is #hi> general rise of pressure which 
carrier to the greotelt disinnce. 
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off more gradually at greater &tan-, and in most casa- it can 
be observed thousands of miles away. Because it havels so far, 
it has been considered to be the most useful basis for monitoring, 
and the control system wbich has been discussed at Geneva de- 
pends entirely on this low-frequency s i p d .  S e i s m o m  have 
been accustomed to observing distant earthquakes with such 
low-frequmcy signals. It see~ns quite cwtain that future mearch 
work will find new ways of distinguishg between earthqualres 
and blasts, making use of other parts of the signal. The *ping 
from a test in a cavity is probably unlike anythmg horn an 
&quake. 
We come next to the questions "How big a cavity is needed 
and how deep underground?" and "Might it be practical ox 
worthwhile to prepare so big a holeT Up to a certain size, the 
bigger the hole is made, the better it mufaes an explosion, but 
beyond that size it doesn't help to make it bigger. To do a g d  
job, it has to be ezlormous, and a good job is pretty good. It is 
good enough to make the bomb seem le0 times smaller than it is. 
That is, the bomb in tbe big avity can be 1%) thna as powerful 
as the one that gives the same 'dull thud" when it is exploded in 
the rock with no cavity around it. The strength of the thud abo 
depends on the kind of rock If the cavity is made in a hard rock 
like rock salt and the thud compared with a bomb wi& no cavity 
in Nevada-type rock where bombs already have k tested, the 
m d e d  shot w d d  seem three hundred Limes less pow& than 
it is. 
But this take a very big hole. I t  requires a volume of 110 
cubic yards for each ton of TNT equivalent, if the mvity is half 
a mile underground. For a twenty-kiloton test, the size of the 
Hiroshima bomb, this would meaa a hole 500 feet in diameter 
at that depth. An empty hole of that size and shape has appar- 
ently never been made, but it probably a d d  be made without 
caving in if it is made in rock salt In fact, a few cavities just 
abut  this big have been made in rock salt and left full of liquid 
which helps to hold up the r d .  They are made by pumping 
water through for some years to dissolve out the salt and then 
used for storing petroleum prducts. But &txe were not made 
in defiance of a control system. If the brine were dumped in a 
river it would be fairly easily detected, and it wwid be very 
difficult to carry out such a construction job in secret. 
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Any deep man-made cavities in other kinds of r d  are very 
much smaller than that. It is doubtful that they could be made 
much larger. Natural caves are not the right shape and not deep 
enough undaxground to be much good Carlsbad C a m ,  if 
a d b l e  from- the National Park service, wwld be good for 
about ten kilotons and cavexps as big as that are extremely rare. 
There is only one other in North America, for example, and the t n ~ h e l o w h e i n b k d y a b o u t a t d a ~ M g .  
If a hole were used of s& volume &am we have been I talking about, the m d h g  would be pmeortionrtely la e f b  tive. If for a twenty kiloton bomb, for example, we were to we 
a hob of half the diameter, 250 feet across i n d  of 500, the 
voIume would be eight times s d e r  md the bomb would seem 
only 15 times Iess powerful than it is, not 120 times. That's st i l l  
a big hole. A control system would perhaps have to Ix more a h t  
for such *partial m a g  than for the most &ective mufltling 
because it would be IESS difEdt to construct a m& hoh 
1 how good is o comml ~ h * ~ v k ?  
I The problem of detecting the cmslxuction of big holes or d e  
tecting the m d e d  signals h bIasts irr big holm is consid- 
erably simplified by the fact that salt  f d m s  occur in only 
very limited geographical regions. Su& regions occupy l e s  than 
1 per cent of the area of the Soviet Union, for exampk, and they 
do not ovmlap the regions where earthquh are frequmt. This 
is v a y  important for it means that at an-site irlspection can be 
made ev"y time there is a seismic signid £ram a region where 
there is salt, even if only a few bpchons are The 
seismic network needs to be apable only of hmting sign& 
frorn a blast mufaed by sucb a hole, not capable of ~~ 
it £mn an &quake. For this, quite weak s i p a h  d i n g  
the apparatus s h d d  d c a .  
The network including seismic stations in the Soviet Union, for 
example, was first seriously considered as a part of a mtm1 
system for unmded wtr. It d d  be able to detect and b t e  
very small tests, down to one Hoton, but not to distinpish all 
these horn earthquakes. 
It is consided desirable U this be suppleme~ted by a 
reasonable number of on-site iqections, so that the control 
organization can SBrnpIe the suspicious si@ by arbitrary 
choice, ta determine whether they were d q u a k e ~ ,  and thus 
make it very likely that a violator would be caught if he should 
make several ~Iandestine t&s of even fairly small bombs. The 
risk of being caught and e x p d  More world opinion should 
be a strong detmexlt to a potent511 violator. 
There are many weak earthquake tremors which might be 
confused with a small underground test, fewer strong en+ 
ta be confused with a larger test. In an average year there are 
probabIy about 100 per year in the Soviet Union strong enough 
to be mnfused with a 20-Won test. With the pattan for dis- 
tii%uting the 21 stations as discussed at Geneva, the controI net- 
work wouId be capable of identifying some of these earthqllakm. 
but leave something like 60 per year unidentified and t h d w e  
suspicious. Twenty hpections per year, giving a sampliug of 
about one out of three, would probably be ample to discourage 
violations. Practically aU of these earthquakes are in the %eismic 
regions" which constitute d y  about onetenth of the area of 
the oountry. If one occurs outside this region, there would be no 
question of sampling; it would be i n s p e d .  
Some r e p &  abut  Congressiond hearings have exaggerated 
the difficulties of monitoring a t~ ban. IE an evader should go 
to a great deal of trouble and is a?& to hide the preparation of 
big hoIes that might b practial to construct, the %station 
network discussed at Geneva would pennit some rather con- 
siderable evasions - up to perhaps % of 1 per cent of the size 
of a big H-bomb, but a rather rnodest extension of the 21-station 
network would make it quite efFective and bring this figure down 
to wd under 1/10 af 1 per cent. 
The reason for emphasis on the 21-station network in the 
U.S.S.R. is historical. It has been favorably discussed and even 
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tentatively a@ upon in the Geneva discussions, and here is 
a tendency for negotiators to b tmaciws on such poiub. Im- 
portant technical irnpruvements in monitoring effectiveness are 
to be expected in the future without i n m a g  the n u m b  d 
stations, and much p t a  improvements will be possible if the 
number of stations mn be inaeased 
There is an important tie-in betweal n u m b  of stations and 
area covered by on-site inspection. This might make it seexn 
reasonable to the Soviets as well as to us to establish conaides- 
ably greater numbers of stations, mostly robot stations. If the 
stations were dmer, as they would be with about 100 stations in 
the U.S.S.R. concentrated particularly m the seismic and salt m 
gions, it would be possible to locate the sowre of eadquake 
signals much more accurately. The technique of making a m- 
parkon signal by going out and exp1dg a ehemid m e  
near the site of the suspicious event can be used more effsctivdy 
with the stations closer together and is expected to be very use- 
ful both for Ioating the event accurately and fm determhhg 
whether it is an earthquake. 
Much of the seismic region is wild mountain country where a 
rather simple on-site inspection wodd show there had been no 
human activity. In other cases a &ed search would be rtt 
quired. One promising method is sirnilax to that used by oil 
pmpectors to locate special layers in the rock. S d  blasts are 
set d€ in a small hole in the &round, and seismcrgraphs set up 
nearby record the reflections of the waves it sends out As we 
have s e m ,  an undmptmd nuclear blast in the soM rocat leave 
a large cavity filled with loose rock, and this cavity would be 
readily found by this method. 
developing arms-control techniques 
Considering the importance of the subject, it seems unfortunate 
that so little research and development has been done on the 
technical problems that arise in controlling a test ban. Tfie 
State Department has a small group dealing witb the problem 
of negotiation. It solicits techuid help from otfier agmcies and 
the Defense lhprhnent lets out contracts for rather modest 
investigations. Back in the early l W s ,  when it was thought 
possible to develop an atomic bomb, though it looked extremely 
Wcult, a cooperative project was set up with large laboratories 
where specialists with various backgrounds could exchange ideas 
while working toward a oornrnon goal. The same was true of 
radar and other important dwehpments. It Is to he hoped that 
we will soon have such an imaginative and ampaative project 
in the broad field of arms control, covering an its poIitica1 and 
psychological aspects as well as its technical aspects, with tbe 
gad of devising the bsst possible. agreements from the point of 
view of reducing the likelihood of war and king acceptable to 
all nations. The contracts already started on #c problems of 
nuclear test control, and international cullaboration on this sub- 
ject which m y  soon be undertaken, would be usefully supple- 
mented by such a general project to explore the future needs of 
more far-raching steps of anns control. 
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
A woridwide cessation of nuclear tests is a step of arms deve1op 
mt control. It doesn't control arms themselves, but it puts a lid 
on their future development. It could be a usefd step wen if it 
remains a Long time the d y  step in this direction It not only 
tends to preserve the techniml possibility of arms mnlrol but it 
provides experience and confidence to enencourage taking further 
steps, 
eontmlting production of n u c k r  materials 
Stopping Nuction of the special materials needed for the con- 
struction of nuclear weapons wodd be another step which mi@ 
s m  be practiml. The degree of inspection is modest enough 
that it might be tolerated under present conditions by the Swiet 
Union. In fact, if the Soviets would agree, it wodd be sensible 
to take tbis action at the same time as &e test ban. S w i n g  
tests requires a detection network which is rather dabmate tech- 
nically. But it does not interfere seriously with militq - 
because on-site inspections wwld have to cover ody relatively 
s m d  areas, mainly in wild regions. Stopping production reg- 
a different sort of inspection-sending inspectors to factories to 
h d  out what is being made. The great nuclear powers have 
already produced so much mat& that tbey would not feel it 
a great militmy hardship to desist from further production, and 
the non-nucIear nations might £4 better about joining an agree 
ment which includes control of nuchar production by the big 
powers. Control of production in the non-nuclear nations would 
provide an additional check on the spread of nuclear weapons. 
dif f icutty of aliminoqing stmtkpiles 
After stopping production, what next? Swze glib props& have 
been made which include getting rid of all nuclear materials, or 
of large parts of the stockpiles. Unfortunately, it is not possible 
to venfy by technical meELns whether a nation has gotten rid of 
all its fissionable material. It has been aptly said that the best 
instrument fox such detection is a screwdriver to open every 
packing case! 
From examination of the histo'y and the present condition of 
all production faciIities, it wwId be possibIe to make a rough 
estimate of the amount of material that has been produced. But 
if the estimated amount were delivexed and datroyed z w d i n g  
to an agreement, other countries would remain uncertain how 
much might be left over. This would be a way to reduce quite 
drastically the amount of material available, but some form of 
assurance against hidden stockpiles would probably be required, 
such as an overwhelming U.N. military mpabfity. It might alsa 
be possibIe to wtablish control of stockpiles by questioning the 
people who should h a w  about them. But the control of the 
stockpiles already produced is so di&cult that it is not promitsing 
as an anarlv step in arms control. 
control of delivery vehicles 
Control or elimination of the vehic l~  of delivery of nuclear 
weapons is a much more promising possibility. If we could b 
come sddently alarmed by the continued arms race to become 
seriously interested in actual disarmament, we should try to 
make agreements for the controllad elimination of long-range 
missiles, hmbing airplanes, rmket-launching submarines, etc. 
Submarines can be controlled through inspection of their bases, 
and bombing planes are easy to find. Missiles present the chief 
problem. If we could reach an agreement fairly soon to eliminate 
them, it should be possible by careful inspection to make sure 
that none are missed. But if several years pass during which 
solid-fuel missiles can be installed in inconspicuous holes in the 
ground, it will become much more Mcult  to enforce a ban. 
no need for s e c ~  
If  we could eliminate ail vehicles for the delivery d nudear 
weapons, we would at the same time practically eliminate the 
need for military secrecy. If there could be complete disarma- 
ment, even Khmshchev has pointed out that there would be no 
further need for secrecy. Bur inspection is needed to verify com- 
pliance in most minor steps of disarmament, no matt= how 
small. And the Soviet Union bas a specid reason to resist roving 
inspectors because it has presumably been succassful in hiding 
the exact location of its missile bases. Elimination of practically 
aU delivery vehicles, particularly all missiles, would be about the 
least that could be done to get past this difficulty. 
Such a substantial step of disarmament would be valuable not 
only in getting rid of the missiles that are poised b exterminate 
wr cities, but would provide improved atmosphere for settling 
otha world problems. Yet caution would seem to demand some 
instrument of force, eihr a world police force or residual na- 
tional armament, to take the plaoe of the nuclear detmrmce 
being given up. Before 1945, war was accepted as a reasonable 
extension of diplomacy as an instrument of national policy. 
There wme circumstances in which war might pay, With the 
nuclear threat, this is no longer true. In a nuclear war, b t h  
sides wodd lose. (There are still those who argue that we must 
have a plausible threat of nuclear war as an instrument of na- 
tional policy, but not war itself. ) 
If we get rid of vehicles for nuclear delivery, or take further 
steps to tame the sudden nuclear threat, there will be problems 
of arranging some kind of balance to discourage aggression. 
With nuclear bombs still in existence, perhaps only in hidden 
stockpiles, the possibility of delivery by commercial aircraft 
would constitute a mild threat. Inspection at airpods could 
guard against this, and ground-to-air missiles and other purely 
defensive systems might be retained which could be very &ec- 
tive against such an improvised attack. The prospects of attack- 
ing would not be likely to tempt a serious military plunner. 
U.N. troops at key troubb spots would probably also be used 
as an important new element of world stability. 
war &ill must be avoided 
But even with strict axms controls, the need for avoiding war 
would be as p t  as ever. For any big war would soon grow 
into a nuclear war. Tbe risk of a devastating surprise attack 
would be eliminated, but dwing initial stages of a conventional 
war there will be a race for the development of effective 
bombers and missiles. Even if the nuclear warheads and mate 
rials couId be eliminated, there would be a rllce to make these, 
for the know-how cannot be erased. There would still be same 
deterrent to a major attack. And if war should occur out of a sud- 
den flame of temper over some incident, there would be time for 
second thaughts before it m l d  reach the proportion of a nuclear 
holocaust. 
The great gains in getting rid of delivery vehidw would be 
the elimination of the danger of an accidental attack which 
could touch off sudden devastation and the elimination of the 
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temptation to seek the advantage of an overwhelming surprise 
attack LE we could fully appreciate the uncertainties of the situ- 
ation, we would probably insist that wr govemsolt pursue 
more seriously the possibility of such a step of disarmament. 
W e  would surely m s e  to tolerate our decade-long faihue to 
establish a vigorous agency with adequate laboratory and de- 
velopment facilities dedicated solely to devising and m i n g  
psibIe paths to a more stable peace through variws degrees 
of arms contro1. 
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I#. Your Id Pmruro and Your h i m  
1 e .  Arthrltir-ltr Tmmlmont and Pmbl.mr 
156. 7.n.-Now How mnd m Haw CIMllmoe 
147. Your Tseth-How 10 Sme T h m  
138. W Nmr About O t a k t n  
137. Know Tour k r t  law Haw focus about Unh ConhoJ 
126. Ihmumot3c Fww 
120. Toward Monlol Haolik 
118. Alcoha!lsm-A Sldnms That Can k Im l sn  
101. rhm alu. Cross Stow 
98. N w - A  b rhh tn  Futum for thm EoIlomtIt 
Imkrpmp Relotions 
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25* year 
Now in their 25th year, the Public Mairs Pamphlets have es- 
tablished a unique reputation for accuracy, timeliness, and read- 
ability. They present in convenient, compact form the Iatest 
findings of research and schdarship on the most im rtant issues 
of our times: sacid, economic, psychological, an X" scientific. 
Subscribe to the next meen pamphlets for $3.00 (30 issues for 
$5.00; 45 issues for $7.00) so as not to miss the important new 
titles coming up. Use them for your group study and pubiic in- 
formation programs. Twenty-five cents a copy; special quantity 
rates as low as 10c apiece on large orders. See inside of cwer 
for some of the current titles. Catalog on quest .  
QUANTITY ; 
RATES I 
1 k 9 w m  W r c  affakr PaapMm,  w.n 2St 
10 to 99 wpl.r ony om p o M k l  ZOc m$d + X l e  
100 to 149 wpl- on7 OM ~ m p h W  18c 19c 
1 2 5 0 t a  4 9 9 e o p k r m n ~ - ~ l a p h M I l c  " " 18e 
500 k 1000 r o p h  m y  on. wmphkt 1% " 16e 
Rmnm au krgmr q n o d f h  owtbbk on w- 
Wo pomw whmn porlwnt a w p o a h  orkr. 
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